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# A Road to "A Redeemed Mankind": The Politics of Memory among the Former Japanese Peasant Settlers in Manchuria

Walter Benjamin once wrote, "Nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history. To be sure, only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past—which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments."[1] What does it really mean to receive the fullness of the past? The individual memory is always unstable and malleable, unable to hold the recollection of every minute of one's past. How one remembers is always susceptible to the ideology (in its broadest sense) of the moment of recollection. In this respect the collective memory may be no better. Only those memories that a group of people could agree on tend to endure, primarily because of the intensity of the emotions those memories inspire. When the members experienced deep trauma, they convey anything but the most devastating memories. If the authoritative discourse, of the government or the media, endorses the narrative of suffering, those of less traumatic experiences disappear. Why can they not cite their past in all its moments? Does this mean they cannot be part of a redeemed mankind?

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In this article I ask this question in my own fieldwork on the former Japanese peasant settlers in Manchuria, Japan's de facto colony in the early twentieth century. They were peasants, impoverished in the wave of economic recessions, who tried to build their new homes in Northeast China, then called Manchuria. In 1905 Japan secured a leasehold of its southern tip, called the Liaodong Peninsula, from Russia as part of war indemnities. The wave of Japanese emigration to Manchuria (and Far East Russia), however, began a few decades earlier.[2] By 1931 about 200,000 Japanese, mostly soldiers, entrepreneurs, women offering services to the male immigrants, and the employees of the South Manchurian Railway Company, had moved to the cities in southern Manchuria.[3] In 1932, after having seized northern Manchuria, Japan established Manchukuo. Although it was a Japanese invention, "a separate state under Chinese leaders who took their orders from Japanese officers and civilian officials," Japan presented it as an independent nation to the international community.[4] Most of the peasant settlers left for Manchuria after 1932. These settlers as well as the earlier group of Japanese emigrants crossed the sea to "Japanize" Manchuria, transforming it into a part of the Japanese empire.[5] Yet I must point out the important differences between the peasant settlers and the rest of the Japanese emigrants. First, although as Japanese they joined the rank of the colonizer, the peasant settlers occupied the bottom of the hierarchy. Second, these peasants could not have migrated to Manchuria without the active intervention of the Japanese state, which provided them with material resources and military protection.

I am not contesting that these settlers suffered in both Japan and Manchuria. At home they were largely tenant or small-scale owner/tenant farmers who suffered from protracted agricultural depression and a serious land shortage.[6] Yokozeki Mitsue[7] vividly describes the economic condition of these peasants when she introduces her father's narrative in her autobiography: "The price of raw silk plummeted. My father uprooted all the mulberry trees and began to plant cabbage, but he could not make any money." All his land was taken away by the landlord. One night he declared to his family, "We cannot live here any more. Our land is gone. All that we can do is to run away to Manchuria!"[8] For Mitsue's father, Manchuria was by no means a glorious colony of the Japanese empire. It was simply where he thought he could escape his material misery.

As to their experiences in Manchuria, the number of people who did not return to Japan after the end of the war vividly tells us of the settlers' enormous suffering: while about 270,000 peasant settlers and their families

emigrated to Manchuria, more than a third of them did not return. They died from Soviet attacks, Chinese animosity nurtured over years of Japan's colonial rule, starvation, diseases, and collective suicide.[9] In addition, thousands of them, particularly the settlers' children, were left in China in the turmoil of Japan's defeat. However, I must make it clear that their suffering in Manchuria came *after* Japan lost this colonial possession. Put another way, the peasant settlers became what they themselves called victims only after 1945.

As I will demonstrate shortly, their memories of suffering in Manchuria are extremely vivid, to the extent that a significant number of them wrote and published books and booklets on these memories.[10] Does this mean they do not remember anything but suffering? Or they remember their everyday life in Manchuria as colonists, and yet they prefer not to share those memories with anyone? If so, is this because the master narrative of Japanese imperialism, which I will discuss later, prevents the former settlers from relating any memories not about suffering? But if such a master narrative changes, and indeed it has changed significantly since the early 1990s, will the way in which former peasant settlers remember their past also change? In short, how should they remember in order to be part of a redeemed mankind? Who can dictate the way they remember? And what is a redeemed mankind? In this article, I will attempt to answer these questions.

The article consists of four sections. First, I present a brief ethnography of the gatherings of former peasant settlers who now live in Nagano. Nagano, a mountainous prefecture in central Japan, sent the largest number of peasant settlers, about half of whom died in Manchuria.[11] In 1988 I met Miyoko (pseudonym), a leader of the group of elderly women and men who regularly gathered to share the memories of their past experiences.[12] As the majority of them were the so-called returnees from Manchuria, they naturally held numerous meetings where they talked about their experiences as settlers and about their family members. Since the narratives I collected among them were primarily those of acute suffering after August 9, 1945, the date of the Soviet Union's invasion into China, I had to rely on the written, mostly official documents, in my endeavor to understand Japan's colonialism in Manchuria. I am not suggesting the absence of historicity in the narratives of former peasant settlers. Nor do I intend to reconstruct the history of Japan's imperialism in Manchuria and of the peasant settlers who became its important part. Rather, I try to explore the relation between the collective memory of former peasant settlers and the history of Japanese

imperialism, or more generally, between memory and history, the topic of increasing interest among historians and anthropologists today.

Second, for this goal I shift my focus from local to national. I will demonstrate that the former peasant settlers form what Maurice Halbwachs calls "an affective community" at both the local and the national levels, thanks to the mass media that has saturated postwar Japan. Halbwachs argues that the existence of such a community is the most important precondition for the production of collective memory.[13] This shift is necessary for me for yet another reason, that is, to relate their memory to the master narrative of Japanese imperialism or History with a capital *H*.

Third, I attend to this History of Japanese imperialism and colonialism not in the works of professional historians but in the dominant, national history propagated through media and taught at school. In academia History has many different names: national history, dominant history, official history, hegemonic history, monumental history, linear history, written history, authoritative discourse, and master narrative. More important (than the mere choice of a term) is the fact that History changes. Indeed, since 1945 the History of Japanese imperialism has not remained the same. Particularly since the death of the emperor Hirohito in 1989, it has been more than ever contested. In this respect History has become "a negotiable goods," and an increasing number of individuals and groups have entered this negotiation with their own individual and collective memories.

In conclusion, I return to the collective memory of former peasant settlers in Manchuria and try to situate it in this changing History. History today coexists with multiple memories. It subjugates certain memories but co-opts others, thereby creating a hierarchy among them. History also competes with memories. Does a proliferation of memory necessarily lead to a democratization of History? This is the last question I will address in this article.



> *The Association to Represent One's Own Pastness (Jibun-shi o kaku kai): Anyone who is interested can sign up for membership at the village cultural center.*

In 1988, when I began field research in rural Nagano, I recognized this notice on the bulletin board in a village government building. Although I

was born and raised in Japan, the term *jibun-shi* was then new to me. It literally translates as *one's own history*, but I will avoid *history* mainly because of its association with *chronology*.[14] Instead, following anthropologist Elizabeth Tonkin, I will translate the term as the *representation of one's own pastness*. She argues, "When we consider that representations of pastness—a cumbersome phrase, but more exact here than 'history'—are made by persons in interaction, situated in real time and space, we can see that however modest the speaker's aim, they are purposeful social actions."[15] I began to participate in the meetings of this association in order to understand the purposeful social actions of its members, many of whom had been to Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s.

In 1988 there were about thirty association members, mostly women in their fifties, sixties, and seventies. During my first stint of fieldwork in 1988 I became a member, and over the next several years I came to know not only these members but their families. Since 1988 some members have left the group because of old age and death. Still, about twenty of them gathered at one meeting in August 1996, the year of my most recent fieldwork in Nagano. From the letters Miyoko occasionally writes to me, I gather they still meet today.

The association members plan their regular meetings around certain historical themes, and they talk, often over food and drink they bring, about their past experiences. During these extensive discussions, members try to find their shared memories, thereby reliving the past with one another. Put another way, various common conceptions and images emerge in the process of talking, and they become, quoting from Halbwachs again, "like a screen over the individual remembrance."[16] Afterward each member writes about her or his own past experiences, making use of this very screen. In 1984, four years before my first stint of fieldwork, the association published its first booklet, collecting articles from about 170 housewives in the area. In 1995 the association published another booklet of the same kind, to which 87 housewives contributed their stories. The association members not only acted as the editors for both publications; they also included the stories of their own past in both booklets. Many of these articles are about the authors' experiences in Manchuria. It is to these written narratives that I now turn.

Keiko wrote the following in the association's 1984 publication. She was a young mother in 1945 and was in her early seventies in 1988. "As many as thirty-nine years have passed since I escaped from northern Manchuria,

fled over mountains and rivers, and finally returned to Japan. I no longer dream of Manchurian bandits chasing after me and my children. The pains and sorrows have all disappeared into my distant past."[17]

Kiyoe wrote the following in the same year:

> Three days after [my husband received a mobilization order], the attitudes of the Manchurians, who had been kind to us until the previous night, suddenly changed. The Manchurian bandits attacked us almost every night since then. I lost all my hope and wondered when I would be killed. But I was still thirty years old. I had to protect my children and mother-in-law and return to Japan with them. We headed toward the hospital. Many in my group were assaulted (by Soviet soldiers and Chinese) and many died of diseases and malnutrition. But thanks to the strong will of our leader, we managed to survive. In October 1946, my children, my mother-in-law, and I finally embarked for Japan. I will never forget the taste of water that I drank upon landing on Japanese soil.

Eleven years later, in 1995, another member, Akiko, titled her article "Tormenting Retreat from Manchuria: My Mother's Right Hand." It is a short essay about an incident that took place, according to her memory, on January 24, 1946, in which her mother was attacked by "a Manchurian bandit" and lost her right hand.

All three women lived in Manchuria as settlers' wives or daughters for several years. Why, then, did they begin their stories with their escape from Manchuria? Indeed, each time the association members speak about or write about their experiences in Manchuria, they almost always begin their stories with the ordeal of escape, starvation, disease, and the death of and separation from their family members after the Soviet Union's invasion of China and the subsequent surrender of Japan to the Allied Forces. They recall the end of their experiences in Manchuria, but they hardly address the beginning, that is, their arrival in Manchuria, or the middle, their everyday life in Manchuria.

I am not the first person to point this out. In analyzing the narratives of former peasant settlers, historian Yamada Akitsugu argues, "1) Their narratives always begin with the time of the Soviet Union's invasion into China or August 15 (when Japan surrendered). If they refer to the period before then, they are very brief. Those narratives hardly touch on the relation among Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans; 2) most describe the rebellions (against

the Japanese) of Chinese bandits, atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers, or devastating epidemics; and 3) they criticize the (Japanese) state that first encouraged the impoverished peasants to emigrate but eventually abandoned them."[18] The intervening period between 1978, when Yamada published his analysis of the former settlers' narratives, and 1996, my last stint of fieldwork, seems not to have radically changed the nature of the settlers' narratives.

I have so far presented only the written narratives of association members. Part of the reason may be a unique feature of writing, which "not only freezes memory, but freezes memory in textual forms which evolve in ways quite unlike those of oral memory."[19] Restated, written narratives freeze memory of suffering exclusively, while oral narratives should be more flexible. If I had interviewed them individually, the association members might have told me how they lived their everyday lives as colonizers. Indeed, on many occasions I did ask them how they arrived at the site of settlement, what it was like, how they treated their Chinese neighbors, or whether they hired them as helping hands. They in turn provided me with the answers. But those answers did not evolve into stories. Instead, as Yamada argues, they became mere introductions or backgrounds for the coming narratives of suffering and devastation. Sachi, for example, was always fond of talking of "a huge, crimson color sun, setting on the vast horizon," which moved her deeply. I gradually realized that she used this particular trope to contrast it to her own suffering at the time of her father's death at the hands of "Manchurian bandits."

Takayama Sumiko (hereafter Sumiko) began her story by saying, "From about 1942, the Japanese army sent an increasing number of soldiers to Southeast Asia. The north became quite empty. That's why the army sent us (peasant settlers) to Manchuria." This statement, however, does not constitute the recollection of her life in Manchuria. Sumiko simply shared with me her knowledge that she acquired later, after she returned to Japan, that the Japanese government promoted peasants' emigration to Manchuria in part to create a military buffer zone against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. Then, completely bypassing the period between 1942 and 1945, Sumiko recounted her ordeal, the loss of her two children in her village's attempt at collective suicide. Her oral narrative was halting and fragmentary, as she talked while crying, resisting my written representation here. For Sumiko, the death of her children was the beginning of her memory. Her ordeal of escape from Manchuria began with an ironic turn of events: a Soviet soldier

shot the village head who had earlier shot her children; this "saved" Sumiko from the frenzy of collective suicide.

On one hand, I appreciate the former peasant settlers' eagerness to share their memories of suffering with me. I believe their suffering in the past and in the present is genuine. On the other hand, I face the question of how to link memory and history. The former settlers' narratives provide me with the raw materials to reconstruct the history of only a very brief period of time, the few years (or even a few months for some) of their escape from Manchuria to Japan. Halbwachs, however, would not call this history. He claims that written history "starts only when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up. So long as a remembrance continues to exist, it is useless to set it down in writing or otherwise fix it in memory. Likewise the need to write the history of a period, a society, or even a person is only aroused when the subject is already too distant in the past to allow for the testimony of those who preserve some remembrance of it."[20] Restated, Halbwachs "judged (memory) unreliable for a scholarly appreciation of the past."[21]

Indeed, the professional historians' treatises of the Japanese peasants' emigration to Manchuria end precisely at 1945, and they do not rely on the testimonies of former peasant settlers. For example, in 1972 seven historians formed a study group on the Japanese agrarian settlement in Manchuria, and in 1976 they published a book titled *Nihon teikoku-shugi-ka no manshū imin* [The emigration to Manchuria under Japanese imperialism]. Their articles cover the following topics: (1) the process of policy formation promoting Japanese peasants' emigration to Manchuria; (2) the examination of various institutions that helped them to emigrate; (3) the relation between their emigration and the problem of economic recessions that affected these peasants at home; (4) the emigration of Koreans, Japan's colonial subjects between 1910 and 1945, to Manchuria; and (5) the anti-Japanese, nationalist movement among Chinese in Manchuria.[22] While there are not many studies on peasants' emigration per se,[23] the works on Manchukuo and Japanese imperialism in general in China are abundant in both Japanese and English. And they, too, end at 1945. A recent volume published by a group of historians at Kyoto University consists of several parts encompassing the politics, economy, and culture of Manchukuo.[24] The three volumes on Japanese colonialism in China published in English by Princeton University Press largely follow the same format, dividing colonialism into political, economic, and cultural spheres from the late nineteenth century to 1945.[25]

To do justice to the authors of these volumes, I must mention that they do see the implication of their works for the contemporary problems of global capitalism. Asada Kyōji, for example, argues that he studies the history of agrarian settlement in Manchuria in order to oppose the Japanese capitalism that has advanced into Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. But he mentions this only in passing in the preface to the book and does not refer to the testimony of any former Japanese peasant settler.[26]

I am not denying the value of these works by professional historians. Rather, I am asking whether it is desirable or even necessary to distinguish memory from history at the time when memory coexists and competes with history. While such a distinction might have made sense in the days of Halbwachs at the turn of the twentieth century, I wonder whether it still makes sense today. Industrialized societies such as Japan face an overflowing of memory, due largely to the ubiquitous presence of mass media. Historian Jacques Le Goff writes, "The whole evolution of the contemporary world, under the impact of an immediate history for the most part fabricated on the spot by the media, is headed toward the production of an increased number of collective memories, and history is written, much more than in earlier days, under the influence of these collective memories."[27] Restated, considering that we have experienced an enormous change in the area of memory, it is no longer possible to draw a clear line between memory and history. Perhaps even in the days of Halbwachs it may not have been possible to separate memory from history.[28]

Scholars are by no means negligent of this. Not only historians but anthropologists and sociologists are actively involved in the study of memory, transforming it into visible scholarship.[29] These scholars argue that history is not so much a matter of truth in the past as "a question of power in the present."[30] Likewise, they argue, memory is not so much a record of the past as a mobilization of the past, in the form of narratives and images, for the present purpose. They also criticize how history and memory were treated separately in academia: history was chronological, nonmythic, and scientific, while memory was nonsystematic, often fictional, and nonlinear. They oppose conflating history with memory, yet they try to create a close link between the two. For them, memory is a part of a social context that constantly changes. Thus memory also has its own history. In the system of nation-states in which we live today, they argue, it is always the state that possesses formidable power to generate its history, or History. History, however, does not obliterate the memories of the nation's inhabitants; rather, personal

memories always interact with History in a complicated way.[31] These scholars, then, argue for the need to engage with as many memories as possible, for the democratization of history as a profession. Furthermore Jonathan Boyarin, among others, argues that memory is by no means an autonomous mental sphere "separate from a sphere of matter and technology."[32] In treating memories, Boyarin argues, we must always relate them to the "technologies of memory/amnesia," including paintings, architecture, monuments, ritual, books, photos, film, video, and even computers.

My task, then, is to connect the former peasant settlers' memories and History of Japan's wartime period. But before doing so, I will examine how the former peasant settlers in Nagano have formed an affective community at the national level, thereby gaining an entry into the negotiation on history. I will also discuss how they have used their narratives of suffering for this purpose, and how they have been helped by the media in this process.

Among the association members the book by Sumiko, titled *Nono-san ni narundayo* [You will become a Buddha] (1987), has been read like the Bible. I read her book a year before my interview with Sumiko in 1991. Sumiko had long thought of writing about her experiences in Manchuria, first as a sister of a settler and later as a settler's wife. She then asked a local government official for advice. He contacted a university professor of history, to whom she sent her manuscript. After reviewing Sumiko's writing, the professor sent one of his graduate students of history to her home as an interviewer. Working with Sumiko, this student reorganized her manuscript in chronological order. After a series of interviews she added what Sumiko had omitted and made her original manuscript into a readable book. The following passage from her book represents a written, and perhaps edited, version of the beginning of her ordeal and the death of her children.

> By the time I entered the barn with Akira (her son) and Reiko (her daughter), most of the people in my village had already committed suicide. I gave my children the last candies and told them, "I will take you to the land of Buddha, so you do what I tell you to do." "Who are in the land of Buddha?" Akira asked. "Your grandma. You can also eat white steamed rice as much as you want." My kids both smiled. "O.K., then, take me, but how do I get there?" Akira asked. "You must put your hands together like this." Facing the east, I put my hands together. I

made Reiko sit on my right side and Akira on my left. Immediately, I heard the sound of gun shots that our village leader fired. Like a rabbit, Reiko jumped up about two meters. Akira too died instantly, vomiting a lot of blood.[33]

By the time of my interview Sumiko had received numerous invitations from city and town governments throughout Japan to be on national lecture circuits and speak of her suffering in Manchuria. On several occasions she was not the only person who spoke of her ordeal. In Hiroshima, for example, she was joined by another woman, who spoke of her suffering from the aftereffects of the atomic bombing. Unlike Sumiko the association members have remained nameless. They published their booklets in small numbers, mainly for themselves to keep. I must emphasize, however, that the former peasant settlers and their families could form an affective, national community of remembrance by reading books like Sumiko's and hearing their authors speak.

Books that the association members often referred to at the regular meetings and that were among the holdings of local libraries include *Kusa no hi: man-mō kaitakudan suterareta tami no kiroku* [An epitaph made of the grasses: The records of the abandoned people, the peasant settlers in Manchuria and Mongolia], by Fujita Shigeru; *Manshū shura no mure: man-mō kaitakudan nanmin no kiroku* [A horde of the dead: The records of the peasant settler refugees in Manchuria and Mongolia], by Gotō Kurando; and *Senzan o koete* [Crossing over a thousand mountains], by Kato Kiyoe.[34] These book titles suggest the settlers' enormous suffering, if nothing else. Gotō, for example, begins his book with the following dialogue that he remembered he had with his wife:

"Just a minute ago, a Manchurian police came over to our house and told me that the Soviet Union invaded."

"The Soviet Union invaded? Where?"

"Where? Manchuria!"

"Manchuria? The Soviet Union? The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria?"

"Yes, he did say so."[35]

Thus the description of Gotō's life from the time of his arrival in Manchuria to the day of the Soviet invasion is entirely missing from his book. Narratives

such as his surely enable the association members to see their community of suffering as part of a much larger, national community.

There is another important factor that has contributed greatly to the making of a national community of former peasant settlers: the increasing visibility, through the media, of their children, who have been left in China since the end of the war and who now have returned to Japan. Here, too, the narrative of suffering has played an important role, through which the former peasant settlers have been reunited with their children. These children are now men and women in their fifties and sixties who have been raised by their Chinese adoptive parents. Yet the Japanese government calls them orphans, a practice it has continuously followed since 1981 when it organized the return trip of the first group of settlers' children to Japan. There are various reasons why they became "orphans." In the turmoil of Japan's defeat in Manchuria, they lost their parents to Soviet soldiers or Chinese who attacked and killed them, they could not follow their parents in arduous journeys of escape, or their parents asked the Chinese they met on their escape journeys to care for their children. Their return trips began late, thirty-six years after the end of the war, or five years after Japan resumed diplomatic relations with China. Since then, more than 5,000 orphans have returned to Japan with their families, more than 4,000 have returned temporarily, and still hundreds are believed to be in China, unidentified and aged.[36]

Below is one entry from the list of thirty-nine orphans who visited Japan in 1990 in search of their identities. The list was published in *Asahi shinbun* [Asahi newspaper], one of the national newspapers.

> Liu Shufen: Separated from her family in the Province of Fanzheng at the age of five. Had lived with her parents, who were Japanese peasant settlers, and a sister. Adopted out, together with her sister, by Liu Diansheng at the concentration camp for Japanese in December 1945. Her sister later died of illness. Blood type, O.[37]

Liu Shufen returned to Japan to search for her parents and other relatives. Even though Liu Shufen is a Chinese name, she is a daughter of Japanese peasant settlers, and hence Japanese. The absence of follow-up articles in the same newspaper suggests that she could not find her relatives and had to return to China.

Since 1981, once or twice a year the Japanese reader has been able to spot such a list in national newspapers—a list of orphans with their short bio-

graphical accounts and photographs. If a reader recognizes an orphan or believes he or she has more information about the orphan, he or she contacts the government. The government in turn invites this potential relative to a series of meetings with the orphan. At such meetings the government relies on a host of volunteers who work in the capacity of interpreters or, more commonly, as sympathizers to the fates of these orphans. The majority of the volunteers are returnees from Manchuria and former peasant settlers. They come not only from Tokyo and its vicinity but from towns and villages far away from the capital, not so much because they think these orphans may be their own relatives. They come because they keenly feel a moral obligation to assist orphans in search of their identities.

In Nagano the published list of orphans always catches the immediate attention of the association members. When a name or biographical account of an orphan resuscitates their memories, the members talk about it extensively. Indeed, some members are still in search of their relatives among these orphans. For example, Harue, a member of this association since 1988, lost her two children in Manchuria to diseases. In the second book that the association published, she wrote, "I covered the face of my son with my scarf, because the soil was completely frozen and my neighbor could not properly bury him. But later I wondered, and I still wonder, whether he might have been still alive then, and whether he still lives somewhere in China today." If her son is still alive, he could be one of those orphans searching for their parents.

In addition, the association members hardly ever miss the TV coverage of the orphans in Japan. The camera zooms in on their emotional encounters with long-lost relatives or on the tears of those who failed to do so. The media conjures them up as innocent victims with tremendous sympathy, innocent because they were then powerless children unable to make their own decisions. At the same time, I always recognized the media's emphasis on the difference between orphans and ordinary Japanese. On the TV screen the orphans look poor and uneducated, suggesting that they lived and still live in backward Northeast China, and that they will never fit in to a modern, affluent Japanese society. After all, they do not speak Japanese, nor do they have the knowledge of Japanese customs. They will surely face enormous difficulties once they return to Japan.

When the orphans do return to Japan, they need a variety of assistance. They also need the help of volunteers, most of whom are, again, returnees from Manchuria and former peasant settlers. At several institutions estab-

lished throughout Japan by the government, including one in the prefectural capital of Nagano, the orphans who have returned to Japan learn the Japanese language and acquire the means to survive in Japan: how to apply for welfare programs, how to shop at a grocery store, how to install a home telephone, how to open a bank account, and most importantly, how to restore Japanese citizenship or obtain it for their spouses and children. As the orphans are rapidly aging, Eiko, a volunteer and herself a returnee from Manchuria, told me, their most urgent problem is to erect their family tombs in Japan, a very costly endeavor.

Most orphans do not yet speak Japanese fluently or write it very well. Yet Japanese readers, including the former peasant settlers, are able to read their written narratives in a variety of print media, from newspapers to scholarly books. These are either translated from Chinese or written by scholars and journalists who interviewed the orphans. They are invariably narratives of suffering. The following is a commentary from one such journalist who interviewed several orphans:

> Do we have the occasion in which we use the term "our country"? For us Japanese, and especially those of us born since 1945, the meaning of this term has become hollow as we take it for granted that we live in "our country." But there is a group of people who have continued searching for the meaning of "our country." Among the orphans, there are those who firmly identify themselves as Japanese. Others were notified of their nationalities out of the blue. These people remember nothing as they were so small when everything happened. Although each individual situation differs, they all long for their country (of Japan) as they long for their (Japanese) parents. They all wish to step on the land of their own country as they wish to see their parents.[38]

The poor orphans, the above quote suggests, do not even know their own nationality; they are unmistakably Japanese, and yet they are deprived of the basic human rights of belonging to their home country. Even though this is not the narrative of an orphan, the reader will surely interpret the reappropriation of this human right as a genuine yearning of all the orphans.

Another group who, like the orphans, have become quite visible in the mass media are the so-called *zanryū fujin*, the women who have remained in China. They are all women who gave up their last hope of returning to Japan and married Chinese in order to survive. These women, according to the postwar Japanese government, were old enough to make decisions (to stay in

China) by themselves. Thus the government has offered these women little assistance in their search for their relatives. In a way, then, these women are more pitiful survivors than the orphans. Their narratives and the narratives of volunteers who work for them are again of acute suffering.

What emerges from this cacophony of narratives (of the former peasant settlers, volunteers, orphans, women who have stayed in China, historians, and journalists) is a trope of suffering and devastation. The suffering, however, is not of the same but of many distinct kinds. The former peasant settlers talk of their diseases, starvation, and attempted suicides in Manchuria. They speak of the loss of their loved ones. They express the sense of having been abandoned by the army and the postwar Japanese government. The volunteers try to convey the experiences of devastation among the orphans to the media and the government. The orphans, through the voices of professionals, talk of their agonies of not even knowing their own names. They speak of the Cultural Revolution in China, in which they were often persecuted as the offspring of Japanese imperialism. They also relate the economic misery in Northeast China today. The professionals lament the absence of basic human rights among these orphans. The women who have stayed in China talk of their agonizing decisions to marry against their will. They express their sorrow at being caught between their two families, one in China and another in Japan.

Michel de Certeau argues, "The strange aspect of memory is doubtless its mobility, such that details are never identical to themselves." He calls this aspect of memory the "art" of memory, that is, the memory's capacity to move, and to "inhabit the space of the other without possessing it."[39] The art of memory facilitates the formation of the collective memory, here, the collective memory of suffering. With a mass media that has infiltrated every corner of postwar Japan, memories travel well from person to person and from group to group, pushing the level of a collective from local to national.

I argue that, in many ways, the trope of suffering has made this travel of memories smoother and faster, for it can be easily appropriated by various parties to the negotiation of History for their distinct purposes. This is why Arthur and Joan Kleinman, who work on the narratives of suffering, remind us of the need to unpack the appropriation of the trope of suffering.

> We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft human responses. Yet, to do so, to develop valid appropriations, we must first make sure that the biases of commercial emphasis on profit making, the partisan agendas of politi-

> cal ideologies, and the narrow technical interests that serve primarily professional groups are understood and their influence controlled.
>
> The first action, then, is critical self-reflection on the purposes of policies and the effects of programs.[40]

My attempt at such a self-reflection constitutes the next section.



In Japan, August is often dubbed the month of the dead, not only because the Bon Festival, during which the spirits of the dead are believed to return home, takes place then, but also because the anniversary of the end of the war, August 15, falls in the middle (but merely coincidentally) of this Buddhist festival. The spirits of Japanese soldiers and civilians who were killed in the war come home, and they include those of peasant settlers and their families who died in Manchuria. In the private space of home and family tomb and the public space of temple and ritual hall throughout Japan, the living welcome the dead, spend several days with them, and send them off at the end of the festival.

Since the beginning of the 1950s, and in the midst of this Bon Festival, the Japanese state has conducted a ritual memorializing more than 3 million war dead. Officially called the Anniversary of the End of the War, the ritual has transformed soldier victims into martyrs, annually renewed this image of them, and memorialized their noble sacrifices for Japan's prosperity. But rituals of this sort, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot demonstrates, "impose a silence upon the events that they ignore, and they fill that silence with narratives of power about the event they celebrate." Christopher Columbus, according to Trouillot, merely "stumbled on the Bahamas" on October 12, 1492, and there is not even a separate entry on this particular day in Columbus's journal. Yet since the sixteenth century the day has been commemorated, first in the Old World and then in the New World. However, the celebration of this particular day has sanitized "the messy history lived by the actors." Put another way, the celebration has obliterated "the context of emerging Europe on and around 1492." What happened has been trivialized and what is said to have happened has been mysticized.[41]

August 15, then, is just like October 12. The state, represented by more than a thousand officials headed by the emperor and the empress and the prime minister, depicts the war as if it happened to Japan just like any other natural disaster. The use of the word *sensō*, a generic term for the war, blurs

the fact that the war dead fought particular battles at particular times and died in distinct locations. Since the turn of the twentieth century, Japan has fought many wars, including the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), World War I (1914–18), the Japan-China War (1937–45), and World War II (1939–45). Between these wars there occurred what History calls incidents, invasions, and occupations. On August 15 all these wars are subsumed under a single term, *sensō*. The Anniversary of the End of the War is indeed emblematic of this particular way of remembrance: "As with natural disasters, the war came to an end; what was fitting for the nation to remember with thankfulness was the fact of ending, and with sorrow those members who did not survive to experience it."[42] Who are "those members who did not survive to experience it"? Are they only the Japanese war dead? Where did they fight and how were they killed? The official discourse of the celebration does not answer these questions. But if one attends this anniversary, one begins to see the faces of the war dead.

In 1998 I was in Tokyo on the fifty-third Anniversary of the End of the War. At 11:50 in the morning the state ritual began at the Japan Hall of Martial Arts, a gigantic building that can house thousands of people, built at the time of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. According to the statement issued by the government, the ritual would memorialize more than 3 million war dead: about 2.3 million of the Japanese army and attached civilians and 80,000 civilian victims, killed at home and overseas. The war dead, according to the statement, included those born in Korea and Taiwan, Japan's former colonies. Until 1993 Japan's former colonial subjects were not among the war dead to be memorialized. In that year the government invited two representatives of the more than 50,000 war dead born in Korea and Taiwan as mourners. In the same year Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro characterized the war as "aggressive" and "mistaken." At the ritual in 1993, also held at the Japan Hall of Martial Arts, he expressed "condolences to the victims of war and their families in Asia and the world over." In 1998 Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo inherited these expressions, which have already become part of what the media calls "tradition." He said, "That war turned out to have given much agony and sorrow to the people of many countries, particularly of our neighbor countries in Asia."[43]

At the site of the ritual the presence of the Japan Bereaved Families Association was conspicuous. It is a powerful lobby group of the bereaved families of Japanese soldiers killed and wounded who have received handsome pensions from the government.[44] In 1998 approximately 6,000 members

of this group participated. Six hundred of them were older than eighty years, and 2,300 were the children of the war dead. The families of the civilian victims killed at home and overseas were the next largest group of mourners. The civilian victims, then, included victims of air raids and two atomic bombs and those who died in Manchuria. Except for the relatives of atomic bomb victims, the families of the civilian victims have hardly received pensions from the government. But standing at the gate of the hall and watching a stream of people entering, I could not tell who were the families of which victims. I was unable to recognize the representatives of the war dead born in Korea and Taiwan either.

Once I stepped outside the plaza surrounding the Japan Hall of Martial Arts, the History of Japan's wartime period became far more complicated. In Chidorigafuchi Park, only about a twenty-minute walk from the state ritual site, I recognized a constant stream of the elderly coming and going. They came to pay respect to the 340,000 souls of Japanese, yet unknown, soldiers. A few stops away on the subway line from Chidorigafuchi Park, about two hundred students and workers held a rally to protest the way the government has celebrated the anniversary of the war's end. They claimed that the war dead in Japan's former colonies and occupied areas have not been receiving due respect from the government. To the contrary, on the compound of Yasukuni Shrine another group protested against the government's characterization of the war as "aggressive" and "mistaken." For them, the war was a just war. The group also criticized about half of the cabinet members, who did not pay respect to the souls of Japanese soldier victims enshrined in Yasukuni. On yet another spot a branch of the Japan Bereaved Families Association met and discussed the need to extend apology, regret, and compensation to war victims the world over. And on yet another location a seventy-one-year-old Chinese survivor of the massacre by the Japanese imperial army related his memories to dozens in the audience. This massacre occurred in his home village on May 27, 1942, and according to the estimate by the Chinese government, about 1,400 Chinese were killed by the poison gas that the Japanese army deliberately used against them.

The media tried its best to report this enormous complexity of the History of Japanese imperialism. In the U.S. media, that the Japanese do not remember themselves as aggressors and only remember their victimization in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is still a cliché.[45] Indeed, until the early 1990s the Japanese media, though not emphasizing Japanese amnesia, portrayed Japanese as the victims, thereby instigating the U.S. media's

contention. The Japanese media of 1998, however, presented a different and far more complicated picture of Japan and the Japanese. Still, the state ritual was reported on the front page of all the major newspapers, with a photograph of the emperor and the empress bowing in front of the epitaph built for the war dead. But the newspaper journalists did not fail to mention other meetings, rallies, and demonstrations held on the same day in Tokyo and its vicinity, albeit in small spaces.

The legal discourse also has contributed to the complexity of Japan's wartime History. Since the early 1990s an increasing number of lawsuits has been brought by non-Japanese against the Japanese government and business firms. The plaintiffs are largely Koreans and Taiwanese. Although born in Korea and Taiwan or in Japan to Korean immigrants, they worked and fought as part of the Japanese imperial army. Such plaintiffs also include B and C class war criminals born in Korea and Taiwan, victims of atomic bombs born in Korea, and former comfort women born in Japan's former colonies and occupied areas.[46] Having suddenly ceased to be Japanese after the postwar peace settlement, they have been abandoned by the postwar government. A small but increasing number of Chinese plaintiffs includes the survivors of the Chinese dragged to Japan in 1941 to be engaged in construction work, civilians who survived Japanese massacres in Nanjing, former comfort women, families of those killed in biological warfare, and those injured by chemical weapons and poison gas left in China by the retreating Japanese army.[47]

In bringing suits against the Japanese government and business firms, these non-Japanese plaintiffs have been greatly assisted by a group of young Japanese lawyers. Their activities remind me of Jean-Francois Lyotard's argument on the notion of victims. He asserts, "It is in the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages and who disposes of the means to prove it. One becomes a victim if one loses these means."[48] Following his argument, Veena Das argues, "A struggle on behalf of the victim must always be a struggle to restore these means."[49] I argue that these lawyers who assist non-Japanese war victims have been struggling precisely for this end. In doing so they have been making history much more complex.

Where, then, should I locate the narratives of suffering of former peasant settlers in this complex and changing History? Where do they, who form

an affective community at both local and national levels, stand in the History of postwar Japan? On the day of the Anniversary of the End of the War, the former peasant settlers indeed look and act like the victims. Furthermore, they situate themselves near the bottom of the hierarchy of war victims. At the top of this hierarchy is the state, which at least until 1993, produced a discourse of the History of Japanese victimization and is still producing a similar discourse with certain modifications.[50] One can interpret the recent series of apologies by high-ranking officials as a mere reflection of the international trend, in which figures such as the U.S. president and the pope apologized for historical wrongs. Their addresses may be only "to secure Japan's status in the post–Cold War global economy,"[51] or to emancipate Japan from what they see as debilitating memories of the Japanese public.[52] Next to the state come the Japanese soldiers and their families, who have enjoyed not only high visibility but large pensions. Among the civilian victims, some, such as the victims of two atomic bombs, have enjoyed more visibility in both domestic and international politics, mainly due to the strong tie between Japan and the United States. To the contrary, the peasant settlers are near the bottom, whether they are dead or alive. They suffered from economic depression and land shortage before emigrating to Manchuria; they were abandoned in Manchuria when the war was over; since their return to Japan, they have received little compensation from the government;[53] and some have received discriminatory treatment in their communities and workplaces simply because they returned from Manchuria. In this ladder of victims, then, those below the former settlers include only Japan's former colonial subjects and other non-Japanese war victims. It is unclear, however, whether this last group is even in this hierarchy of war victims. In short, among Japanese the peasant settlers are the worst victims; thus they could accuse all the parties above them as the victimizers.

In 1988 when I began participating in the association's regular meetings in Nagano, I expected the members to criticize the History of Japanese victimization, the still-dominant discourse at that time. Unlike the victims of air raids and two atomic bombs, who could be co-opted by the Japanese ultranationalists as the victims of "American imperialism," I thought, the former peasant settlers in Manchuria could disrupt the History of Japanese victimization, thereby potentially forcing the nation to confront its past in China. But this did not happen, primarily because all the other parties, including the state, claimed that they, too, were victims. The former settlers' notion of

victimhood remained so complex and elusive because they failed to identify the ultimate victimizer.

As I have argued, however, History has been changing, gradually but noticeably. It is still the victims' history, and yet it simultaneously portrays Japan as an aggressor. It still views Japanese citizens as victims but also points out their complicity in the act of aggression. How can the former peasant settlers cope with this changing History while continuously speaking and writing of their suffering? This is also the problem of a historian and anthropologist, that is, this author's problem. I know that the suffering of former settlers and their children is genuine. I know I cannot dictate the way they remember their past; they have their own past, and they can remember it in any way they want. But I also know that in this changing environment of History, the former peasant settlers have been frustrated over how they should represent their memories not only to the public but among themselves. I also have been frustrated about how I should represent their narratives without instigating the international media's criticism of Japan's amnesia of its past conduct. By way of conclusion, I will suggest a future scenario of the relationship between History and the memories of former peasant settlers. I also would like to suggest a few strategies that historians/anthropologists could take in representing the former settlers and their children's narratives.[54]

Such a scenario anticipates the emergence of an affective community of remembrance beyond the national boundary. It is an international community of suffering of distinct kinds, open to former Japanese soldiers, Japanese settlers, their children, Chinese, and anyone who is interested in this subject. I was prompted into this scenario by a series of articles published in *Asahi shinbun* in 1998 based on the confessions of former Japanese soldiers. These soldiers, although still few in number, have recently admitted in public the atrocities they committed in China. They individually communicate with journalists and scholars in order to confess, but they guard their anonymity as much as they can. The media publishes their stories, which almost always contain graphic descriptions of atrocities. Below is an example. Quotation marks indicate the narrative of a confessor, a seventy-two-year-old man, while the rest is the narrative of the reporter.

> A man confessed that he killed a Chinese woman. He asked her for a watermelon, but she refused. He stabbed her chest with his bayonet on the spot. "Why, for just a little watermelon worth nothing? This is the

> season of watermelons, but I always see the reflection of her face on the smooth surface of the fruit. I see my bayonet piercing through her chest, and then, her back. I see myself kicking this old woman with my dirty boots. I see her face, I hear her cry. . . . I hate watermelons. They make me remember everything."[55]

In this quote he speaks of his torment; he is unable to get rid of his guilt. The reader does not understand his motive for confession. He may have tried to cleanse his sins by confessing his past wrongdoing, or he may have wanted to express his genuine wish to be accountable for his acts. I think of his counterpart, a seventy-one-year-old Chinese man who spoke of his and his fellow villagers' agony to the Japanese audience on August 15, 1998. Can this former Japanese soldier and others who confessed their wartime acts meet him? Can the former peasant settlers join them? If so, an entirely new context of an affective community of remembrance will give new meaning to the suffering of its members. Indeed, the orphans and those women who have remained in China have already been speaking in this borderless context; they do not speak as Japanese or Chinese, but as those who fall between Japan and China. It is professionals, one must remember, who often replace their narratives in the national order of things.[56]

Hence, how we professionals represent the narratives of war victims becomes extremely important. Here Dominick LaCapra's work seems to help us greatly. In his relation to the Holocaust victims, LaCapra uses a psychoanalytic approach. The Holocaust victims are the victims of severely traumatizing events. They tend to respond to trauma, LaCapra argues, by "acting out," that is, "emotionally repeating a still-present past." LaCapra, however, warns us against criticizing the acting out of trauma victims, for such a critique may facilitate the inclination to blame the victims or lead us to the "dry historical reconstruction of fact." Instead, LaCapra suggests "working through" the victims' memories in order to connect memory and history. "Working through" implies the possibility of judgment that is "augmentative, self-questioning, and related in mediated ways to action." It calls for "a combination of narrative and commentary in self-aware historiography" and "a possibility of linking critical historiography with certain dimensions of memory." Working through, then, will enable us to critically read history against the grain and to "recover different possibilities for the present and future."[57]

How can one work through all these individual and collective memories

that have proliferated in postwar Japan since the early 1990s? Many scholars of memory and history argue for the need to engage with as many memories as possible, for they believe that such an engagement will lead to the democratization of history. Historian Arif Dirlik, however, points out, correctly to me, that the proliferation of memory or the fragmentation of history often entails simultaneous forgetting. He argues thus in his analysis of both scholarly and popular literature on the Cultural Revolution in China. In the general mood that portrays the Cultural Revolution (or any revolution) as mistaken and meaningless, what has been forgotten, in the proliferation of memories of victimization, corruption, and survival, is the understanding of the societal conditions in China before the Revolution and the vision of alternatives it inspired.[58] In a different context of postwar Japan, Lisa Yoneyama suggests that the Japanese politicians' apologies for Japan's wrongdoing, one response to the proliferation of memories, "pose serious threats to heretofore marginalized memories."[59] Those former Japanese soldiers who try to cleanse their sins by admitting their past similarly pose the threat of forgetting, unless their confessions are linked to the memories of other victims in a meaningful way. Remembering thus always coexists with forgetting.

Lastly, returning to Benjamin, in order to be a redeemed mankind, one does not have to remember everything or to cite the past in all its moments. Instead one must have the courage to remember and share with others something that History does not allow him or her to do. After all, only a redeemed mankind can potentially change History from a burden to an instrument of liberation, by not only remembering but listening.[60]

**Notes**

I wish to thank all the participants in the conference "Space, Place, and Identity: Harbin and Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century" held at the University of Toronto, Canada, in 1998 for their insightful suggestions to this article. I am also grateful for the guidance and encouragement I have received from Norma Field, Stephan Vlastos, and Arif Dirlik. Audiences at a number of institutions where a different version of this article was presented, including the University of California at Irvine, the University of Michigan, UCLA, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of California at Berkeley, forced me to clarify some crucial points. Fieldwork at various stages of this research was funded by the North East Asia Council, the UCLA Center for Japanese Studies, and the University of California Presidential Office in Humanities. Finally, I wish to thank the members of the Association to Represent One's Own Pastness in Nagano, who continue to share with me their memories and who have helped me greatly to understand the present.

1 Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York, 1968), 254.

2 Barbara Brooks, "In the Service of Empire: Japanese Women at the Margins of Colonial Culture in Northeast Asia" (paper presented at the conference "Space, Place, and Identity," Toronto, 1998).

3 The South Manchuria Railway Company, established in 1905, was much more than Japan's colonial railway company. It owned and operated extensive lines of railways, managed the so-called attached areas of land to these railway lines, owned and managed numerous properties within these areas, and launched various new industries. In 1907 the company set up its own research department that carried out extensive economic and scientific research relevant to the government of Manchuria. See Ramon H. Myers, "Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1906–1933," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ, 1989), 101–32.

4 Peter Duus, "Introduction: Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: Overview," in Duus, Myers, and Peattie, *The Japanese Informal Empire in China*, xxviii.

5 Louise Young, "Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 94.

6 Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA, 1998), 354.

7 For Japanese names I cite surnames first, following Japanese customs.

8 Yokozeki Mitsue, *Shōwa: on'na o ikiru* [Shōwa: Living a life of a woman] (Nagano, 1990), 15.

9 Ogawa Tsuneko, *Sokoku yo: chūgoku zanryū fujin no han seiki* [Yearning for my country: The life of a half-century of a Japanese woman left in China] (Tokyo, 1997), 28. The figure for returnees/survivors varies. Louise Young argues, based on Foreign Ministry surveys published in 1956, that among 223,000 settlers resident in Manchuria at the end of the war, only 140,000 (63 percent) ever returned to Japan. See Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 411.

10 See also Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in *Postwar Japan As History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 77.

11 As the peasants' emigration to Manchuria was coordinated by what Louise Young calls "the migration machine," in which national, prefectural, and local governments were closely involved, the numbers of emigrants were officially recorded by the prefecture. The top-ranking prefecture, Nagano, sent 37,859 peasant settlers to Manchuria, approximately 13 percent of the total number of settlers from Japan. Yamagata, the second-ranking prefecture, sent only 17,177. See Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 329–30.

12 I use first-name pseudonyms for all the association members in order to protect their privacy. Full names, such as Yokozeki Mitsue, are the authors' names.

13 Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vide Yazdi Ditter (New York, 1980), 30–33.

14 See Gerald Figal, "How to *Jibunshi*: Making and Marketing Self-Histories of Showa among the Masses in Postwar Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies* 55 (1996): 902–33; quotation below from 906. Figal translates *jibunshi* as "self-histories." His focus is on *jibunshi* writing as an individual project, which "becomes standardized and marketed to fit and sell an ideal narrative pattern" in contemporary Japan. Such a narrative pattern tends to fit in the discourse

of national history, primarily because the author relies on the mass-marketed manuals on "how to *jibunshi* making." The narratives I discuss in this essay are the products of collective memory making. They are akin to what Luisa Passerini calls "memories of self" or "self representations." For these reasons I have avoided *history* in my translation of *jibunshi*. See Luisa Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class*, trans. Robert Lumley and Jude Bloomfield (Cambridge, UK, 1987).

15 Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History* (Cambridge, UK, 1995), 3.

16 Halbwachs, *Collective Memory*, 34.

17 *Manchurians* in the narratives of Keiko and other former peasant settlers refers to Chinese living in Manchuria. The settlers use *Manchurians* not because they distinguish the ethnic Manchurians from the Chinese. Rather, for them the natives in Manchuria were the Manchurians, except for those readily distinguishable people such as Russians and Koreans.

18 Yamada Akitsugu, *Kindai minshū no kiroku: manshū imin* [The records of the masses' activities in modern Japan: The emigrants to Manchuria] (Tokyo, 1978), 49.

19 James Fentress and Chris Wickham, *Social Memory: New Perspectives on the Past* (London, 1992), 9.

20 Halbwachs, *Collective Memory*, 78–79.

21 Patrick H. Hutton, "Collective Memory and Collective Mentalities: The Halbwachs-Ariés Connection," *Historical Reflections* 15 (1988): 311–22; quotation from 312.

22 Manshū Imin-shi Kenkyū-kai, ed., *Nihon teikoku-shugi-ka no manshū imin* (Tokyo, 1976).

23 See, for example, Araragi Shinzō, *Manshū imin no rekishi shakaigaku* [The historical sociology of the Japanese emigrants to Manchuria] (Kyoto, 1994); Asada Kyōji, *Nihon teikoku-shugi to kyū shokuminchi jinushi-sei* [Japanese imperialism and the land holding system in the old colonies] (Tokyo, 1989); Asada Kyōji, "Manshū nōgyō imin to nōgyō tochi mondai" [The peasant settlers in Manchuria and the agrarian land problems], in *Iwanami koza: kindai nihon to shokuminchi*, ed. Ōe Shinobu (Tokyo, 1993), 77–102; Kuwajima Setsuro, *Manshū busō imin* [The soldier emigrants to Manchuria] (Tokyo, 1986); Yamada, *Kindai minshū no kiroku*; and Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.

24 Yamamoto Yūzō, ed., *Manshūkoku no kenkyū* [Studies on Manchukuo] (Kyoto, 1993).

25 Duus, Myers, and Peattie, *Japanese Informal Empire in China* and *Japanese Wartime Empire*; Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, NJ, 1984).

26 Asada Kyōji, preface to Manshū Imin-shi Kenkyū-kai, *Nihon teikoku-shugi-ka no manshū imin*, vol. 1; see also Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 399.

27 Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York, 1992), 95.

28 In this context, Yael Zerubavel argues, "Collective memory thus continuously negotiates between available historical records and current social and political agendas. In this process of referring back to history, collective memory shifts its interpretation, selectively emphasizing, suppressing, and elaborating different aspects of these records. History and memory, therefore, do not operate in totally detached, opposite directions; their relationship are underlined by conflict as well as by interdependence." His argument suggests

that history and memory are *always* in contact. See Yael Zerubavel, "The Death of Memory and the Memory of Death: Masada and the Holocaust As Historical Metaphors," *Representations* 45 (1994): 72–100; quotation from 73.

29 These works include Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY, 1990); Jonathan Boyarin, "Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory," in *Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time and Space*, ed. Jonathan Boyarin (Minneapolis, MN, 1994), 1–37; John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, CO, 1992); Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (New York, 1989); Michel de Certeau, "On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life," *Social Text*, no. 3 (1980): 3–43; Johannes Fabian, *Remembering the Present: Painting and Popular History in Zaire* (Berkeley, CA, 1996); Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*; Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington, IN, 1986); Michael Herzfeld, *A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca, NY, 1996); Le Goff, *History and Memory*; Liisa H. Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago, 1995); Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory*; Luisa Passerini, *Autobiography of a Generation: Italy, 1968*, trans. Lisa Erdberg (Hanover, NH, 1996); Joanne Rappaport, *The Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretation in the Columbian Andes* (Cambridge, UK, 1990); Sharon R. Roseman, "'How We Build the Road': The Politics of Memory in Rural Galicia," *American Ethnologist* 23 (1996): 836–60; Rubie S. Watson, *Memory, History, and Opposition: Under State Socialism* (Santa Fe, NM, 1994); Geoffrey M. White, "Remembering Guadalcanal: National Identity and Transnational Memory-Making," *Public Culture* 7 (1995): 529–55; and Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atomic Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity," *Public Culture* 7 (1995): 499–527.

30 Rappaport, *Politics of Memory*, 15.

31 Watson, "Memory, History, and Opposition under the State Socialism: An Introduction," in Watson, *Memory, History, and Opposition*, 1–20; quotation from 9.

32 Boyarin, "Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory," 12.

33 Takayama Sumiko, *Nono-san ni narundayo* (Nagano, 1987), 133–35.

34 Fujita Shigeru, *Kusa no hi: man-mō kaitakudan suterareta tami no kiroku* (Kanazawa, 1989); Gotō Kurando, *Manshū shura no mure: man-mō kaitakudan nanmin no kiroku* (Tokyo, 1978); Kato Kiyoe, *Senzan o koete* (n.p., 1995).

35 Gotō Kurando, *Manshū shura no mure*, 14.

36 I obtained these figures from the pamphlet provided by Chūgoku Zanryū Koji Engo Kikin, a volunteer organization for the "orphans" from China.

37 *Asahi shinbun*, February 26, 1990. Among these thirty-nine orphans, three visited Japan the second time as their first attempts to search for their relatives were unsuccessful. Each entry is accompanied by a photo of the face of an orphan, and two are accompanied by photos of "a vase given to the Chinese adoptive parents" and "a plate given to the Chinese adoptive parents" when their parents asked them to take care of their children.

38 Noda Yasuko, preface to *Nicchū no hazama ni ikite* [Having lived between China and Japan], ed. Samamoto Tatsuhiko and Noda Yasuko (Tokyo, 1988), 5–7.

39 Certeau, "On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life," 42, 41.

40 Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman, "The Appeal of Experience, the Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times," in *Social Suffering*, ed. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock (Berkeley, CA, 1997), 18.

41 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, 1995), 114–18, 140.

42 Norma Field, "War and Apology: Japan, Asia, and Fiftieth, and After," *positions* 5 (1997): 1–49; quotation from 3.

43 In translating newspaper articles in this paragraph, I consulted Field, "War and Apology."

44 On the Japan Bereaved Families Association, see Takagi Ken'ichi, *Sengo hoshō no ronri* [The rhetorics on war compensation in Japan] (Tokyo, 1994), and Tanaka Nobumasa, Tanaka Hiroshi, and Hata Nagami, *Izoku to sengo* [The bereaved families and the postwar period] (Tokyo, 1995).

45 See Yoneyama, "Memory Matters," 500.

46 The term *comfort women* refers to more than 100,000 women across Asia who were forced to serve as sexual slaves for the Japanese military. In 1991 three Korean women who identified themselves as "military comfort women" filed a suit against the Japanese government for violating their human rights. Since then the issue of comfort women has been one of the focal points around which the question of Japan's war responsibility has been discussed. See, for example, Watanabe Kazuko, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Trafficking of Women: 'Comfort Women' Forced into Sexual Labor for Japanese Soldiers," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 26 (1994): 3–17.

47 *Los Angeles Times*, October 6, 1997.

48 Quoted in Veena Das, *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India* (Delhi, 1995), 174.

49 Ibid.

50 See Gluck, "Past in the Present," 83; Field, "War and Apology," 3.

51 Yoneyama, "Memory Matters," 501.

52 See LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust*, 73.

53 In 1967 the Japanese government began paying 160,000 yen to each former peasant settler in Manchuria who had lived in Manchuria for more than a year and was older than fifty. The government distributed this amount over a period of ten years. Consequently a returnee received only 16,000 yen a year, or about $120 (using the current exchange rate). See Jin'no Morimasa, *Tairiku no hanayome* [The brides who left for the continent] (Tokyo, 1992).

54 I thank Arif Dirlik, who contributed to the writing of this final section.

55 *Asahi shinbun*, August 11, 1998.

56 See also Malkki, *Purity and Exile*. The narratives of the Hutu refugees in Tanzania have provided Malkki with a means to break down the national order.

57 LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust*, xii, 64, 59, 210, 212.

58 Arif Dirlik, "Revolutions in History and Memory: The Politics of Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective," in *Postmodernity's Histories* (Lanham, MD, 2000), 19–62.

59 Yoneyama, "Memory Matters," 525.

60 Le Goff, *History and Memory*, 99.

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